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structure	 Package	 –	 a	 revised	 Regulation	 on	 trans-European	
infrastructure.	
The	Regulation	 foresees	 identifying	and	 selecting	 ‘projects	of	
common	interest’	(PCI)	through	a	multi-stage	process	as	 fol-
lows.	Project	promoters	nominate	a	gas-infrastructure	project	
to	 one	 of	 four	Regional	Groups	 that	 reflect	 the	 priority	 cor-










of	 this	 long	design	process,	ACER,	 the	Commission	 and	 the	





systematically	 reviewing	 CBA	 methods.1	 It	 presents	 recom-
mendations	 on	 four	 areas	 in	 the	 gas-CBA	 method	 that	 are	
potentially	controversial:	(1)	the	time	horizon	of	the	CBA,	(2)	
project	 interaction,	 (3)	monetization	models	and	(4)	 ranking	
of	the	projects.	
1.	 Meeus,	L.,	von	der	Fehr,	N.H.,	Azevedo,	I.,	He,	X.,	Olmos,	L.,	Glachant,	
J.M.,	 2013.	Cost	 Benefit	Analysis	 in	 the	Context	 of	 the	 Energy	 Infra-
structure	 Package.	 Florence	 School	 of	 Regulation	 Policy	 Brief,	 Issue	
2013/02.	ISSN	1977-3919.
Recommendations for cost-benefit 
analysis for gas-infrastructure projects
We	 present	 recommendations	 to	 cope	 with	 four	 potentially	
controversial	 areas.	These	 areas	 are:	 (1)	 time	 horizon	 of	 the	




Recommendation 1: Projects can be evaluated against different 
time horizons and these horizon options affect the relative net 
present values of projects; A single reference point for 20-25 years 
is best practice for the time horizon for infrastructure projects 
and should be used for gas CBA.
It	 is	common	for	 infrastructure	projects	 to	have	a	horizon	of	
20	to	25	years	for	the	analysis,	even	if	the	project	will	provide	
benefits	for	a	longer	horizon	as	is	the	case	for	pipelines,	under-
ground	 storage	 and	 LNG	 terminals.	 ENTSOG	 acknowledges	





costs	 and	 benefits.	This	method	has	 been	designed	 for	 com-
paring	projects	with	the	same	reference	point,	which	refers	to	
the	 start	 of	 the	 investment,	 and	 the	 same	 planning	 horizon,	
which	refers	to	the	lifetime	of	the	investment.	To	accommodate	
the	 comparison	 of	 projects	 effectively	 having	 different	 refer-










the	 cash-flows	 when	 the	 project	 is	 effectively	 commissioned	
later.
Option 2	consists	of	creating	a	separate	time	horizon	for	each	












cash-flows	 that	 fall	 within	 that	 horizon.	This	 option	 implies	
that	 there	 is	 a	 cut-off	 point	 for	 the	 calculation	 of	 benefits	








3	 favors	 project	 2.	 We	 highlight	 that	 the	 Regional	 Groups	







Recommendation 2: Project interaction is important and can be 
treated within the cost-benefit analysis; the Regional-Group level 
is better suited to carry out cost-benefit analysis that accounts for 
project interaction.






together.	Project	 interaction	 is	 important	 information	for	 the	
Regional	Groups	 and	 project	 promoters	 and	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
treat	it	in	the	baseline	definition	and	in	the	project	definition	of	
the	CBA	method.
Within	 the	 baseline	 definition	 of	 the	 CBA	 method,	 two	
approaches	can	be	used	to	track	down	competing	and	comple-













groups	 are	 also	 better	 placed	 to	 define	 subsets	 of	 projects	 to	
create	the	double	infrastructure	baseline.	
The	 CBA	 method’s	 project	 definition	 should	 facilitate	 the	
tracking	 down	 of	 project	 interaction	 in	 two	ways.	 First,	 suf-
ficiently	 detailed	 project	 information	 is	 needed	 in	 terms	 of	
technology	type,	geography	and	engineering	features	to	allow	
the	proper	delineation	of	individual	de-clustered	projects.	This	
information	can	assist	 in	 the	 tracking	down	of	 the	particular	
projects	that	are	interacting.	In	fact,	 it	 is	best	practice	in	gas-
infrastructure	studies	on	the	project-promoter	level	to	compare	
competing	project	 alternatives	 on	 the	 aforementioned	 terms.	
Second,	project	promoters	should	be	stimulated	to	bring	their	
Figure 1. 
Net present value for two projects against three possible horizons: (1) single reference point N (presumed commissioning dates 
C1=C2=N) and 20 years of operation (N>N+20), (2) two reference points (C1=3 and C2=9) and 20 years of operation discounted to 
common time reference (N>C1+20 and N>C2+20), and (3) single reference point N and 20 years horizon (N>N+20) with projects 
commissioned at C1=3 and C2=9, respectively (own depiction).
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complementary	projects	into	a	single	project	cluster,	providing	




Recommendation 3: Monetization models consist of input, 
output and an algorithm.
The	addition	of	a	new	piece	of	infrastructure	has	several	effects.	
The	monetization	of	these	effects	requires	models	to	be	inter-
nally	 consistent	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 physical	 and	 commercial	
relations	that	govern	the	gas	system.	Due	to	the	novelty	of	CBA	
for	 evaluating	 and	 selecting	 gas-infrastructure	 projects	 on	 a	







Recommendation 3a: The monetization-model output needs to 





case	 additional	 analysis	 should	 be	 carried	 out.	 Finally,	 some	
effects	can	be	dismissed	from	the	monetization	for	the	reasons	
explained	below.
The	 reduced	 list	 of	 significant	 effects	 starts	 from	 a	 compre-






a	 significant	 effect	 for	 all	 projects.	They	 are	 obtained	 as	 part	
of	 the	financial	 analysis	 for	 the	project	 and	no	 further	mon-
etization	is	needed.	Supply-cost savings	refer	to	all	supply-side	
effects	 of	 a	 project.	They	 are	 significant	 for	 all	 projects	 and	
should	be	monetized.	Gross-consumer surplus encompasses	all	
demand-side	savings	as	well	as	changes	 in	the	capacity	rents.	
This	 effect	 should	 also	be	monetized.	Note	 that	 in	 this	 effect	



















carbon	 price.	 Other	 social and	 environmental costs such	 as	
landscape	costs	should	be	integrated	into	infrastructure	costs	
as	they	are	linked	to	construction	and	other	requirements	that	
have	 to	 be	 met	 by	 the	 project.	 Separately	 monetizing	 these	
externalities	could	lead	to	double	counting	of	the	same	benefit.	
Finally,	 (3) Macro-economic effects	 of	 infrastructure	 invest-
ments	can	be	significant,	but	are	likely	to	be	of	the	same	order	
of	magnitude	 in	 the	defined	Regional	Groups	 and	 thus	 their	
dismissal	from	the	monetization	will	not	significantly	affect	the	
relative	values	of	projects.
Supply-	 and	 demand-side	 savings	 are	 then	 the	 two	 retained	
effects	 for	 the	monetization,	 noting	 that	 infrastructure	 costs	
Figure 2. 
Comprehensive effect mapping; the inner ring represent effects 
in the gas system, the middle ring are externalities and the outer 
ring the macro-economic effects (own depiction).





monetization	model	 should	 then	at	 least	 include	price	 levels,	
consumption	 levels,	 and	 supplied	 quantities	 from	 domestic	
production,	spot	trade	and	long-term	contracts.	
Input
Recommendation 3b: The monetization-model input should be 
monitored for the explicitness and transparency of its assump-
tions and for the validity and accuracy of its data.
The	 input	 side	 of	 the	model	 is	most	 critical	 as	 it	 determines	






Assumptions	 are	 needed	with	 regard	 to	 the	demand for gas,	
which	 can	 be	 an	 explicit	 or	 implicit	 function	 of	 relative	 fuel	
prices	 and	 of	 externalities	 that	 have	 been	 internalized	 as	
explained	in	the	previous	section.	In	general,	a	simple,	yet	vali-
dated,	‘engineered’	demand	function	will	be	sufficient.	On	the 
supply side,	 cost	and	other	contract	parameters	 such	as	min-
imum	and	maximum	levels	need	to	be	defined	for	 long-term	
contracts,	 for	 local	production	capabilities,	 for	LNG	supplies,	
which	can	also	be	 long-term	contracts,	and	 for	underground	
storage,	 which	 has	 both	 demand	 and	 supply	 characteristics.	
Finally,	assumptions	are	needed	with	regard	to	the	physical	and	
commercial	network	capacities.	Note	 that	 the	physical	 trans-






Recommendation 3c: The monetization-model algorithm needs 
to ensure internal consistency of physical and commercial rela-
tions while making trade-offs between higher accuracy of the 




















sumption.	This	 consistency	 also	 includes	 the	 specification	 of	
appropriate	boundary	conditions	that	link	model	outcomes	if	
sequential	monetization	models	or	model	runs	are	used.
Gas-dispatch	models	 can	be	made	 compliant	with	 the	 afore-
mentioned	input,	output	and	algorithm	requirements	and	can	
be	used	to	monetize	those	effects	that	have	been	identified	as	







4. Ranking of the projects
Recommendation 4: Ranking should be primarily based on the 
monetization with transparent adjustments where justified; 
ENTSOG should provide guidance to the Regional Groups on 
how the CBA method has been conceived for selecting projects.
ENTSOG	does	not	address	ranking	in	its	draft	method	because	
the	 ranking	and	selection	of	projects	 is	 the	exclusive	compe-





ever,	 transparent	 adjustments	 might	 be	 justified	 to	 accom-






list	 of	 significant	 effects.	 Second,	 the	 Regional	 Groups	must	
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Third,	 the	 benefits	 of	 some	project	might	 be	more	uncertain	
than	those	of	other	projects.	The	Regional	Groups	need	infor-
mation	on	the	robustness	of	the	benefits.	This	information	can	
















cess,	 to	 which	 this	 brief	 contributes	 with	 its	 four	 structural	
recommendations,	will	help	improve	the	method	to	become	a	
robust	tool	for	evaluating	and	selecting	gas-infrastructure	proj-
ects	of	European	interest.		
